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Copyright subsists in creative works that are “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,” usually understood as making fixation a prerequisite for protection.1  
However, some argue that denying copyright to unfixed works unfairly denies 
protection to certain classes of artists or works, and that fairness, or concern for 
those classes of artists or genres, requires that they receive the benefit of copyright 
ownership for those unfixed works.  These arguments generally assume the benefits 
of copyright protection to the artist, and often by unexamined extension to society.  
However, copyright ownership has social costs as well as social benefits.  This 
Article examines the possible costs of applying copyright protection to unfixed 
works, in the context of the specific artists, traditions, genres and practices that rely 
mainly on unfixed works.  It argues for a deeper, more empirically grounded 
understanding of the creative process and a broader definition of values that arise 
from culture making, and thus a broader understanding of the public policy 
implications in copyright law. 
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Copyright subsists in creative works that are “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”2  The American intellectual property tradition has usually read this to 
mean fixation is a prerequisite for protection.3  But over the years, some have 
argued that denying copyright to unfixed works unfairly denies protection to certain 
classes of artists or works, and that fairness, or concern for those classes of artists or 
genres, requires that they receive the benefit of copyright ownership for those 
unfixed works.4  These arguments generally assume the benefits of copyright 
protection to the artist, and often by unexamined extension to society.  However, 
 2. Id. 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing federal copyright protection to apply to 
“writings”); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (holding only "physical rendering[s]" of 
expression are protected); Galoob v. Nintendo, 564 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding derivative 
works must be fixed to be protected under Copyright Act); 1 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][2], 1–49 (1991). 
 4. See Geoffrey Donat, Fixing Fixation:  A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational 
Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1997) (arguing that improvisational performers face obstacles 
seeking federal protection for their works, many of which are not fixed in permanent form); Jonathan Z. 
King, The Anatomy of a Jazz Recording:  Copyrighting America's Classical Music, 40 COPYRIGHT L. 
SYMP. (ASCAP) 277, 310 (1997) (noting that improvisational jazz is incompatible with copyright law 
and the incompatibility creates inequities); Joi Lakes, A Pas de Deux for Choreography. 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1829, 1859 (2005) (arguing that fixation requirement is constitutionally required but that 
choreographers should be given leeway because of difficulty of fixation); John R. Zoesch III, 
Discontented Blues:  Jazz Arrangements and the Case for Improvements in Copyright Law, 55 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 867, 872 (2005) (advocating for a more flexible standard for derivative works to provide 
adequate protection to jazz arrangements).  But see Steven Globerman & Mitchell Rothman, Should 
Performers Have a Copyright?,  8 CAN. PUB. POL’Y /ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 165 (1982) (finding no 
compelling evidence of significant social benefits produced by performers’ right). 
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copyright ownership has social costs as well as social benefits.5  This Article 
examines the possible costs of applying copyright protection to unfixed works. 
At the outset, such a project may seem redundant.  A fixation requirement’s 
practical advantage is clear cut:  unless a work is in fixed form, it is difficult to 
prove whether it has been infringed, since the work itself is not available as 
evidence.6  Even in places where fixation is not a prerequisite for copyright 
protection, most disputes over unfixed works simply do not reach the courtroom, 
for these evidentiary reasons. 7  That said, its evidentiary value has not prevented 
arguments against the fixation requirement.8  Unfortunately, although many 
arguments assert the unfixed works’ value, they tend to assume that value (or 
enough of it to matter) depends on a proprietary attitude towards the works, thus 
framing the issue as a choice:  Do we leave things unowned/unprotected or do we 
own/protect them?  But walls and fences do more than protect; they also enclose, 
and their unchanging nature also “fixes” or regularizes and rigidifies the social 
relationships that generate works (among other things they generate).  Therefore, 
when altering property law, we should examine the social relations surrounding 
those alterations and the effects of those alterations in their social context.  If 
 5. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 57 (2003) (summarizing the historical objections to 
intellectual property on antimonopoly grounds); Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright 
Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2007) (“[Methodological commitments of conventional 
copyright analysis] produce both an inflated notion of copyright’s role in stimulating creativity and an 
insufficiently keen appreciation of the harms that overly broad copyright can cause.”); Rosemary 
Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV 237 (1996) (emphasizing the importance 
of examining who and what “gets left out on the information highway . . . ”); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1013 (1990) (explaining the importance of the public domain as both the 
price the public pays for copyright protection and a check on copyright’s restrictions); Stacy F. 
McDonald, Note, Copyright for Sale:  How the Commodification of Intellectual Property Distorts the 
Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 HOW. L.J. 541, 542–43 (2007) (discussing the social 
bargain inherent in balancing the rights of copyright owners and the public); Neal Netanel, Copyright 
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) (explaining that copyright law must 
always strike a “precarious balance” between providing incentives for authors and promoting “public 
education and creative exchange . . . ”); Susan Sell & Christopher May, Moments in Law:  Contestation 
and Settlement in the History of Intellectual Property, 8 REV. INT’L POL. ECONOMY 467, 468 (2001) 
(“[T]here has been a recurrent tension throughout the history of intellectual property between 
protection/exclusion and dissemination/competition.”); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 
(2006) (discussing the various social effects of intellectual property in relation to the weakness of its 
economic foundations); cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit:  Copyright Law and Subcultural 
Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007) (arguing that standard models of creativity under 
copyright are insufficient to describe the ways in which creators of fan fiction, etc. conceive of authors’ 
rights). 
 6. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 718 (2003) 
(“[T]he main justification for the fixation requirement is that unfixed work would present considerable 
challenges with respect to proof.”). 
 7. See Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law:  The Fairness and Morality 
of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 573 (2006) ("Fixation 
may theoretically be optional under French law, but it actually appears to be essential to performers in 
order to have evidence of their works."). 
 8. See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law—And That Ain't Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 
1943 (2005) (arguing that unfixed, improvisational jazz is inadequately protected under the copyright 
law’s definition of a derivative work, in part because improvisation is not always fixed); supra note 4. 
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copyright law depends primarily on music’s value as a commodity and a finished 
product of individuals’ labor (and there is much to suggest that it does), then 
collective and process-oriented practices will fit awkwardly within copyright law’s 
“protection” and might suffer under its extension.  I will discuss this possibility 
below. 
Starting with a counter hypothesis, I examine whether there is social value in 
leaving unfixed works outside of copyright’s scope.  Rather than assuming that the 
unfixed works are valuable in the same way as fixed ones, or that value is a one 
dimensional characteristic, I ask:  “What is particularly of value to society in 
unfixed works, and what relationship does that value have to copyright law?” 
I focus on music improvisation particularly with respect to jazz improvisation, 
but discussion here may be applicable in other realms.  My hope is that the social 
values identified here in improvisation, if identified in other artistic and social 
ventures, can be similarly examined with respect to the law’s ability to facilitate or 
inhibit them.  Creative practices that include many aspects common to 
improvisation (such as repetition or reference to existing works) should be 
examined in the context of the social values that those practices may create. 
Parts I and II describe improvisatory music’s basic elements and explore music 
scholars’ and performers’ accounts of improvisation:  its nature, its effects, its 
contributions to musical society and society at large and its relationship to 
copyright law.  Part III discusses the arguments for and against including 
improvisation within copyright protection.  Part IV attends to the ways that 
applying copyright protection could limit or harm the values generated by 
improvisation. 
I.  DEFINITIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
A.  WHAT IS IMPROVISATION? 
“Improvisation enjoys the curious distinction of being both the most widely 
practised [sic] of all musical activities and the least acknowledged and 
understood.”9  Improvisation is easy to name, but hard to describe.  Although 
performance in all musical genres includes it, improvisation is particularly essential 
to jazz.10  This may help account for jazz scholarship’s dominance of improvisation 
 9. DEREK BAILEY, MUSICAL IMPROVISATION:  ITS NATURE AND PRACTICE IN MUSIC 1 (1982). 
 10. See id. at 64 (asserting that the lesson of jazz for Western musicians is its focus on 
simultaneous performance and creation, i.e. improvisation); INGRID T. MONSON, SAYING SOMETHING:  
JAZZ IMPROVISATION AND INTERACTION 2 (1996) (developing an “ethnomusicological perspective of 
jazz improvisation centered on interaction” of sounds, social networks and cultural meanings); 
Olafunmilayo Arewa, From JC Bach to Hip Hop:  Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 599–613 (2006) (arguing that music borrowing and improvisation is a pervasive 
aspect of all musical genres, not only jazz); David Borgo, Negotiating Freedom:  Values and Practices 
in Contemporary Improvised Music, BLACK MUSIC RES. J. 22, 165 (2002) (providing that freedom and 
improvisation have been crucial to jazz since its inception); King, supra note 4, at 279; Larry Solomon, 
Improvisation II, 24 PERSP. NEW MUSIC 224, 226 (1986); Candace G. Hines, Note, Black Musical 
Traditions and Copyright Law:  Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463, 483 (2005) (noting 
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studies.  Many meticulous scholars of improvisation come from within the free jazz 
scene in particular.  Free jazz may be an extreme case, arguably the most 
improvisatory music practice:  there is often no single work providing a framework 
around which participating musicians improvise, and by all accounts, free jazz 
(sometimes also called “free improvisation”) is the least tied to any formal musical 
structures.11  The functions and values described in free jazz are also present in jazz 
in general, in improvisation in other contexts and even to some extent in all 
music.12  But we should see free improvisation not as an anomaly, but instead as 
the far end of the scale; this allows analysis of free improvisation to shed light 
across all music, if in differing degrees.13  Since improvisation exists across genres, 
issues that improvisation studies raise are relevant to every musical performance to 
some degree.14 
In this Article, “improvisation” means creating music in the moment, where the 
act of performance is simultaneously an act of composition.  This definition does 
not mean that all composition occurs in the performance moment, but instead that 
improvisation is the art of arranging spontaneous elements in conjunction with 
“precomposed” elements.15 
This conjunction matters a great deal.  It is vital to understand that improvisation 
includes complex interactions with precomposed works:  “Improvisation involves 
reworking pre-composed material and designs in relation to unanticipated ideas 
conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special conditions of performance, 
thereby adding unique features to every creation.”16  Although unscripted, 
improvisation never exists in a cultural or musical vacuum.17  While decisions by 
the improviser occur in the moment, they occur in relation to precomposed material 
and the environment or context in which the act of improvising takes place. 
The aspect of improvisation that automatically sets it outside copyright law is 
that creation occurs without writing or other fixation.  Absent recording, copyright 
currently does not much apply to performance (except for digital performance):  
performers do not retain rights in songs they did not write, arrangements cannot be 
copyrighted except as derivative works which require a license from the underlying 
that the modern jazz style centers around improvisation); Note, supra note 8, at 2. 
 11. See PAUL BERLINER, THINKING IN JAZZ:  THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISATION 172 (1994); 
Solomon, supra note 10, at 230–31. 
 12. See generally BAILEY, supra note 9, at 2; BRUNO NETTL ET AL., IN THE COURSE OF 
PERFORMANCE:  STUDIES IN THE WORLD OF MUSICAL IMPROVISATION 6 (Bruno Nettl & Melinda 
Russell eds., 1998); Arewa, supra note 10, at 598; John P. Murphy, Jazz Improvisation:  The Joy of 
Influence, 18 BLACK PERSP. MUSIC 7, 15, 17  (1990) (emphasizing importance of improvisation in 
analyzing jazz); Marshall J. Nelson, Jazz and Copyright:  A Study in Improvised Protection, 21 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 35, 35–37 (1974) (describing a rise, decline and re-emergence of 
improvisatory techniques in music). 
 13. Solomon, supra note 10, at 226. 
 14. Id.; see also BAILEY, supra note 9, at 3 (“[T]he main characteristics of improvisation could be 
discerned in all of its appearances and roles.  What could be said about improvisation in one area could 
be said about it in another.”); Arewa, supra note 10, at 599. 
 15. NETTL ET AL., supra note 12, at 5; see also BERLINER, supra note 11, at 102–03, 222. 
 16. BERLINER, supra note 11, at 241. 
 17. Id. at 7; BAILEY, supra note 9, at 152; see also King, supra note 4, at 311–13. 
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work’s author and unfixed works are not covered by copyright.18  Although all of 
these aspects—performing rights, derivative works rights and the fixation 
requirement—affect copyright law’s application to improvisation, this Article 
addresses only the issue of fixation.  My hope is that proposed alterations regarding 
the derivative works rights and performance rights will also take into account the 
points here regarding the practice and social value of jazz improvisation. 
B.  IMPROVISATION’S MESSY FIT WITH COPYRIGHT LAW 
Arguments for reforming the fixation right vary in scope from focusing on 
particular genres of art or music to making broader arguments about improvisatory 
works.  However, they generally agree on two main points.  First, since improvisers 
cannot own copyrights in their creations if they are not recorded, copyright 
protection is not uniform across artists and genres and therefore unfair.  Second, 
improvisatory creators’ lack of copyright ownership hurts their ability to survive, or 
hurts the improvisatory genre’s ability to flourish.19 
Statements like “[j]azz improvisation has never commanded the rights and 
privileges that other, more conventional works have” imply that this situation 
(undoubtedly true) leaves jazz improvisers worse off than they otherwise would 
be.20  But this argument does not well account for how improvisation is valued by 
improvisers, their communities and the larger society, or for the relationship 
between copyright law and creative practice. 
Most simply, the focus on royalties obscures as much as it reveals, since lack of 
royalties does not mean that improvisers are unpaid.  Many improvisers are paid in 
the moment, as performers, rather than after the fact through royalties.21  While 
some composers also perform, and thus get paid both for performance and 
royalties, some do not, so the basis for comparing composers and improvisers is 
more complicated.  It may seem unfair, or even arbitrary, that someone who 
composes in the moment gets only the one payment, while those who compose 
ahead of time get a chance for a second payment, plus control over how others use 
the work.  But might composers who write the music ahead of time lose out in 
some respects, compared to improvisers?  The difference between precomposers 
and improvisers may be deeper than just differences between owners and 
nonowners of property. 
 18. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a . . . musical arrangement.”); see also Zoesch, supra note 4, at 874. 
 19. See, e.g., Donat, supra note 4, at 1364 (suggesting that lack of copyright protection has 
contributed to jazz’s lack of economic success); King, supra note 4, at 277 (discussing the “fairly 
accurate suspicion that copyright law has somehow forgotten about Jazz and failed to protect . . . Miles 
Davis as comprehensively as Irving Berlin”); Note, supra note 8, at 1940 (“Jazz is in trouble . . . 
copyright law will not stop its descent, with its ill-fitting doctrines.”); Warren Shaw, Note, Copyrighting 
Improvised Music, 32 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 109, 110 (describing improvisation’s “second-class 
treatment throughout the history of American copyright law”). 
 20. King, supra note 4, at 310. 
 21. Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business, 43 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 685, 698 (2009). 
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Applying copyright law to improvisation could bring harms as well as benefits 
to improvisers.  Most equity based arguments for granting ownership to 
improvisers do not account for any effects of copyright ownership on the creative 
process, and simply elide the steps from copyright protection to promoting 
creativity, and thus do not accurately address costs and benefits.22 
Misevaluating cost and benefit in this way arises from an overly narrow 
understanding of copyright law along several dimensions.  First, uncopyrighted 
works may be valuable to society as a whole, and not just in terms of the possibility 
to contribute to future copyrighted, royalty-generating works.  Second, existing 
copyrighted works may be important to creative practice, and thus to artists and to 
society, in ways that are not strictly economic, although they may trigger other 
public interest concerns.  Lastly, evaluating benefit to the artist should account for 
the extent to which artists also use or consume other works, and should not conflate 
the interests of individual artists at one point in time with the interests of other 
artists, themselves in the future and society at large.23  Improvisation as a social 
practice needs to be examined in a situated manner, in relation to specific people in 
specific relationships and social situations.  We should look at what improvisation 
means to improvising musicians, to the communities they are part of and to the 
larger society they exist within.  Only by incorporating this kind of information 
about music-making can copyright policy be meaningful and relevant to musicians 
and to society at large. 
II.  IMPROVISATION AS A PROCESS 
To explore improvisation’s social function and social value, we must primarily 
turn to the scholarship on music that exists outside the legal realm.  This is because 
most legal scholarship on improvisation falls into the problems described above.  
Commentators see copyright attachment simply as a value-adding activity, or only 
examine improvisation in the ways that it diverges from copyright law, without 
spending much time on the meanings and functions of improvisation for 
improvisers, their communities and society at large.24  However, systematically 
examining the meanings, functions and values of a musical practice has a well-
developed history in ethnomusicology, and is found in cultural studies and other 
fields as well.  Notably, some of the most determined legal advocates of increasing 
copyrights for jazz do not call on any of the monumental works about jazz and 
improvisation conducted by people who have dedicated their lives to the study of 
 22. See Donat, supra note 4, at 1381, 1384–1403 (treating the reconciliation of the federal 
copyright statute and improvisational performance mainly as a technical and administrative problem and 
not a creative one); Shaw, supra note 19, at 115 (asserting that the fair use doctrine will clear up any 
confusion around the creative process). 
 23. See, e.g., Kevin J. Greene, Copynorms, Black Cultural Production and the Debate Over 
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179 (2008) (arguing that copyright 
regime failed to benefit black artists as a class). 
 24. But see Arewa, supra note 10, at 599–613; Hines, supra note 10, at 483 (“The modern jazz 
style, which centered on improvisation, greatly suffered because of its incompatibility with copyright 
protection.”). 
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(and in many cases performance of) jazz. 
The remainder of this Article will examine the ways in which extending 
copyright protection to unfixed works could limit the specific social value of 
improvisation by interfering with these practices.  Here, my goal is not to argue for 
a defining improvisation universally, but rather to argue that there are central 
tendencies we might call improvisatory, and beyond that those tendencies may 
have desirable byproducts, which copyright and other cultural policies should 
attempt to foster. 
A.  WHAT IS TO BE PROTECTED AND CAN COPYRIGHT ADEQUATELY PROTECT 
IT? 
Although focusing particularly on the analysis and testimony on improvisation, 
it bears repeating that the aim of this Article is not to argue that improvisation is 
wholly different from creative practices.  Instead, I suggest that the improvisation is 
an interesting case, a set of socially embedded musical practices that clash with 
copyright law, whose significance reveals what is at stake for artists and society 
when these clashes happen. 
1.  Improvisatory Authorship Confounds Ownership 
However much you try, in a group situation what comes out is group music and some 
of what comes out was not your idea, but your response to somebody else’s idea . . . .  
The mechanism of what is provocation and what is response-the music is based on 
such fast interplay, such fast reactions that it is arbitrary to say, “Did you do that 
because I did that?  Or did I do that because you did that?”  And anyway the whole 
thing seems to be operating at a level that involves . . . certainly intuition, and maybe 
faculties of more paranormal nature.25 
The above quotation represents a common account of improvisation:  a story of 
interplay between the various performers, musical interplay between various 
preexisting musical forms and a reference to something ineffable, outside our usual 
understanding of how the world works.26  Individual ownership of musical works 
is difficult to assign in the face of musicians’ dense interplay and the presence of 
this ineffabili
Interplay is one key aspect of improvisation, evident in the jazz tradition despite 
the fact that we call a primary element in jazz a “solo.”27  In a solo, one musician 
musically diverges from the precomposed aspect of a song, before rejoining at a 
chorus or other agreed upon theme.  However, soloists often play alongside other 
musicians, especially the rhythm section:  drums, bass and often piano.  Soloists 
 25. Borgo, supra note 10, at 175 (quoting Evan Parker, saxophonist/improviser and seminal 
figure in the European Free Jazz scene). 
 26. See BAILEY supra note 9, at 126 (“Each player who comes along affects the common pool of 
language.  When you hear a new player . . . . then you have to go back and re-think everything.” 
(quoting Steve Lacy, jazz improviser)); MONSON, supra note 10, at 73. 
 27. King, supra note 4, at 316–17. 
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“rely on the rhythm section players to improvise appropriate rhythmic feels or 
grooves against which they can weave their improvised melodies.”28  This common 
practice of multiple performers multiplies improvising, and makes assigning 
ownership rights complex and the basis questionable.  Even in accounts of 
improvisation where one artist is playing without any others at a particular moment, 
musicians emphasize the creative input they feel from each other and the 
audience.29  Lastly, the improvisation occurs at least partly in response to the song 
being improvised within, including previous solos by that performer or others, and 
in response to others’ memories of other performances or recordings of that song.30 
Improvisation is “a process-oriented model of performance that accents 
freedom, responsibility, risk-taking and mutual engagement between both 
practitioners and listeners” and a reference to something ineffable, outside our 
usual understanding of how the world works.31  Copyright law currently addresses 
the question of joint authorship by looking to a contract or, in the absence of a 
contract, to the musicians’ intent at the time of creation.32  Contracts are a 
theoretical solution to rights allocation, and on the surface quite appealing, for they 
appear to allow the participants most affected to negotiate their interests between 
each other.33  However, contracts are a poor solution for community-oriented 
practices, perhaps especially related to creativity.34  Individualistic interest in 
control over later use of a musical contribution could contradict the kind of creative 
interplay fundamental to improvisation.  Intent may get at some of the performers’ 
interests, but still faces difficulties based in the fluidity of the relationships between 
specific performers, like “soloists” versus “backing musicians,” who often trade off 
within a song, and the fluid, dynamic relationships with the audience and 
preexisting music. 
2.  Process Not Product:  No Closure = No Enclosure 
Improvisation’s reliance on dynamic interplay also calls into question the 
usefulness of focusing on a “musical work.”  As much as legal scholars have 
 28. MONSON, supra note 10, at 1. 
 29. Daniel Fischlin & Ajay Heble, The Other Side of Nowhere:  Jazz, Improvisation and 
Communities in Dialogue, in THE OTHER SIDE OF NOWHERE:  JAZZ, IMPROVISATION AND COMMUNITIES 
IN DIALOGUE 23 (Daniel Fischlin & Ajay Heble eds., 2004). 
 30. I will address this point of engaging with history and memory further infra, Part I-C-1. 
 31. Fischlin & Heble, supra note 29, at 22. 
 32. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or 
more authors with the intention that their contribution be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole”). 
 33. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains:  The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1825–26 (1990–91) (“[T]he adjudicator might think that free choice is good and 
agreements should be enforced because we value the discipline that it instills for people to think through 
their agreements, write them down, and stand by them.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Right 
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 538–59 (1998); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can't Do:  
The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 407–20 
(2005). 
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challenged and historicized the concept of “author,” we ought to think carefully 
about the concept of a musical “work” as a unitary item with agreed-on boundaries 
and an identifiable author/owner.35  This concept is historically contingent on 
particular attitudes of nineteenth century Europe and not necessarily applicable in 
all times and places.36  Even in Europe, before the nineteenth century, music was 
more improvisatory and less associated with individual authors, with plenty of 
borrowing and room for performers to add their own ideas in performance.37  The 
value of a piece rested as much in recognizing the performer’s contribution and the 
performer’s choices in performance.38  It is only after the concept of a lone genius 
composer rose to prominence that the musical piece itself, frozen in time by written 
notation, was understood as the primary effect of genius.39 
Since copyright law developed, historically, alongside the development of the 
concept of musical works as singular, fixed works, it is possible that copyright law 
helped to create, or at least reinforced reliance on the concept of a musical work, 
through the particular form of its incentive and administrative structure.40  This is 
precisely the problem with extending copyright law to cover new fields:  such an 
act may alter the contours of cultural practice.  While that alteration is not 
automatically bad, it goes beyond simply increasing or decreasing creativity or 
other social goods, and thus should be examined as a cultural policy decision (and 
not only trade policy) in whatever jurisdiction is considering an alteration to 
copyright law. 
In improvisation, the process of doing is as much in improvisers’ minds as are 
 35. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On The Author Effect:  Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:  TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE 29, 29–32 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE 
AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET 35, 35–39, 52–53 (1994) (discussing origin of Romantic author 
concepts in literature); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:  THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) 
(challenging and historicizing the concept of the author); JASON TOYNBEE, CREATING PROBLEMS:  
SOCIAL AUTHORSHIP, COPYRIGHT AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE 1, 9 (2001), available at 
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/pavis/papers.php (putting forward the concept of a “field of 
works,” a more broadly conceived set of symbolic resources which creators draw on); see also King, 
supra note 4, at 314. 
 36. See LYDIA GOEHR, THE IMAGINARY MUSEUM OF MUSICAL WORKS:  AN ESSAY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC 205–42 (1992); ROSE, supra note 35, at 1, 4 (noting the historically and 
culturally contingent nature of authorship and discussing the eighteenth century as the era of struggle 
towards that definition of authorship culminating in a contemporary form of copyright); see also Keith 
Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:  Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1324 (1996). 
 37. BAILEY, supra note 9, at 29–42 (providing history of Baroque improvisation in eighteenth 
century Europe); Arewa, supra note 10, at 550. 
 38. See GOEHR, supra note 36, at 152. 
 39. Anne Barron, Introduction:  Harmony Or Dissonance?  Copyright Concepts and Musical 
Practice, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 25, 41–42 (2006); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:  The 
Metamorphoses of "Authorship" 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 471 (“[A] tendency developed to define the 
‘author’ reflexively, in terms of the ‘work’”), 472 (“The ‘authorship’ concept, with its roots in notions of 
individual self-proprietorship, provided the rationale for thinking of literary productions as personal 
property with various associated attributes including alienability.”). 
 40. Barron, supra note 39, at 42. 
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the musical sounds they generate.41  If we take seriously that idea, and understand 
improvisation as a practice, we must think more carefully about bestowing 
copyright protection on a “musical work” since that validates what might be called 
a byproduct, rather than the product, of improvisation.  At the very least, assigning 
value and legal boundaries to the musical work may be inconsistent with the goals 
and interests of musical improvisers, and at worst it may create interference with 
the practice of improvising. 
Although it would be difficult to measure the music’s overall value to society 
before and after the work concept’s dominance, relying on the category of “work” 
as marking inclusion in a legal system systematically devalues musical practices in 
favor of musical products.42  Focusing on “works” may make it particularly hard to 
measure social values: 
[P]recisely to the extent that it has succeeded in circumscribing the boundaries around 
the intangible object in a tolerably clear and objective manner, this “physicalist” 
strategy [relying on the “work” concept] has also failed to identify what is of value in 
the object: what it is that makes it worth protecting in the first place.43 
Focusing on “works” may render the social forest invisible for the musical trees 
since one can pass the time counting, measuring and improving one’s methods for 
doing so, and miss how the social practices proliferate, social relationships change, 
and miss a social understanding of value.  To understand creativity and what is 
necessary for it to flourish will require looking at more than creativity’s 
byproducts.44 
Due to its fluid nature, even absent the fixation requirement, improvisatory 
music might be characterized as exactly what the musical “work” concept leaves 
out.  Indeed, many aspects of the work concept that make it incompatible with 
copyright law are improvisation’s defining characteristics:  “The nature of work in 
improvisation, as I understand it, is not to create a finished product but rather to 
treat work itself as a process through which improvisations are worked out, worked 
over, or worked on, but never finished in the traditional sense . . . of ‘achieving 
closure.’”45  The question of “closure” is an interesting one for copyright law.  If 
improvisations are not closed (in the sense of being finished), they may in a way be 
“unenclosable” by a property system.  Seeing improvisation as an ongoing process 
is particularly antithetical to the idea of exclusive protection, or at least pushes the 
 41. See generally Dana Reason, “Navigable Structures and Transforming Mirrors”:  
Improvisation and Interactivity, in THE OTHER SIDE OF NOWHERE:  JAZZ, IMPROVISATION AND 
COMMUNITIES IN DIALOGUE, supra note 29, at 71. 
 42. A similar concern about the “freezing” of a practice or tradition into a work arises for 
folklore, which is “continuously utilized and developed within the indigenous community.”  Christine 
Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples:  Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997). 
 43. See Barron, supra note 39, at 43. 
 44. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture:  Locating the Public Domain, 
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 166 
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 45. Reason, supra note 41, at 78. 
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concept of exclusivity into rather broad territory—since at any point an ongoing 
process might include more content, there would never be a definable site of 
protection.46  Moreover, focusing on protection at any chosen time may reduce an 
improvisation’s value as a dynamic process.  Challenging creators of later versions 
to seek permissions from owners of earlier versions encourages a focus on a 
finished product that contradicts what many see as important about improvisation:  
as Eddie Prévost, jazz drummer and founder of free improvisation group AMM 
notes, “[I]mprovisation is fragile.  Its transience leads to a vast number of 
evolutionary prospects.”47  Prévost emphasizes that transience and fragility are not 
weaknesses requiring copyright protection, but valuable sites for creative 
expansion.  Allowing that transience may be the best way to preserve the value of 
improvisatory work.  In fact, some improvisers go so far as to suggest that an over-
reliance on the score (or fixed work) leads to it being a “dictator of musical thought 
and performance.”48  This critique suggests that it is antidemocratic to rely too 
much on the fixed, bounded aspects of music, a suggestion I will take up further 
below. 
3.  The Potential Economic Values of Flexible and Collaborative Practices 
Focusing on individual products like “works” may also prevent us from 
recognizing how these flexible and collaborative practices may also be productive 
economically, if one refines one’s view of an economic system away from one 
based on excludable property rights.  Beyond missing that productivity, focusing on 
encouraging “works” rather than “communities of creativity” might even hinder 
creativity.  This suggests we should carefully examine examples of creativity that 
diverge from copyright law. 
One example of a musical community with a different dynamic in relation to 
copyright law is the Grateful Dead and “jamband” scenes, which have succeeded in 
creating and maintaining alternate social norms that are based less on excludability 
than on access to (and creation of) musical recordings by fans.49  The absence of 
particular aspects of copyright enforcement in that scene does not mean that there 
are no rules, but rather that the community has its own socially enforced rules.  A 
similar case may exist in many improvisation scenes:  social practices may already 
be enforcing the kinds of rights that most feel are appropriate. 
In addition, the different dynamic has benefited the jambands enormously: 
I think it is probably the single most important reason that we have the popularity that 
we have . . . [T]he proliferation of tapes [of live performances] . . . formed the basis of 
a culture and something weirdly like a religion . . . .  A lot of what we are selling is 
 46. See generally Lee B. Brown, “Feeling My Way”:  Jazz Improvisation and its Vicissitudes—A 
Plea for Imperfection, 58 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 113 (2000) (describing jazz music’s 
constantly changing and spontaneous nature). 
 47. Reason, supra note 41, at 76 (quoting AMM associate Eddie Prévost). 
 48. Solomon, supra note 10, at 229. 
 49. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  What Jambands Can Teach Us 
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 668–72 (2006). 
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community.  That is our main product, it’s not music.50 
It’s possible that improvisatory communities have also benefited from their 
divergence from traditional copyright law, rather than suffered.  As will be 
discussed below, many improvisation scholars posit a causal relationship between a 
strong community based in reciprocity and improvisational practices.51  If 
“community” is the product, or at least a valuable effect that society might have an 
interest in, then we should concern ourselves with copyright law’s impact on the 
ability to generate or support community. 
B.  THE SOCIAL VALUE OF IMPROVISATION:  MUSIC MAKING COMMUNITY 
1.  Community-Building Between Artists 
“A moment of community, whether temporary or enduring, can be established in 
such moments through the simultaneous interaction of musical sounds, people, and 
their musical and cultural histories.”52  Improvisation scholars and practitioners 
broadly agree that improvised music exists within and flourishes because of the 
communities in which it occurs, and also contributes to the maintenance of those 
communities through its dialogic practices.  Many social theorists and jazz 
theorists/performers explicitly argue that improvising encourages a kind of social 
engagement that some political theorists would likely find desirable.  In this 
section, I outline how copyright law may conflict with improvisation’s practices 
that reinforce and build community, and democratic participation in discourse.  
Indeed, “jazz improvisation and creative improvised music have always . . . been 
about community building (rather than individual self-expression), about fostering 
new ways of thinking about, and participating in, human relationships.”53 
For many performers, improvisation’s success appears to be in the act of 
communicating musical ideas.  Communication requires shared understanding.  
Harold Budd, a member of several free improvisation ensembles and noted 
performer in other genres as well, says that improvisation fails when improvisers 
are “not really basing their language on anything that means very much to other 
people, including their compadres in the ensemble.”54 
Those discussing improvisation commonly emphasize language and 
communication.  For example, the improvising-as-conversation metaphor comes 
from the musicians themselves.55  It also comes from scholarship that is intimately 
 50. Id. at 670 (quoting Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow). 
 51. See, e.g., Bjørn Alterhaug, Improvisation on a Triple Theme:  Creativity, Jazz Improvisation 
and Communication, 30 STUDIA MUSICOLOGICA NORVEGICA 97, 114 (2004); Fischlin & Heble, supra 
note 29, at 23. 
 52. MONSON, supra note 10, at 2. 
 53. Fischlin & Heble, supra note 29, at 23. 
 54. Forum, Improvisation, 21 PERSP. NEW MUSIC 26, 53 (1982–83) (quoting Harold Budd). 
 55. See, e.g., MONSON, supra note 10, at 8 (“Like Berliner, I found that the metaphor of 
conversation occurred frequently in musicians' discussions.”). 
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acquainted with the practices and arguments of actual improvisers, particularly 
ethnographic research on jazz musicians.56  As Richard Davis notes, “That happens 
a lot in jazz, that it’s like a conversation and one guy will . . . create a melodic 
motif or a rhythmic motif and the band picks it up.  It’s like sayin’ that you all are 
talking about the same thing.”57 
Conversation is not simply the trading back and forth of whole statements.  As 
mentioned above, musical conversation relies on improvisers leaving things 
unfinished so others can finish them. 
[A] lot of times when you get into a musical conversation one person in the group will 
state an idea or the beginning of an idea and another person will complete the idea or 
their interpretation of the same idea, how they hear it.  So the conversation happens in 
fragments and comes from different parts, different voices.58 
This testimony highlights the act of conversation as the event’s essence, with no 
one person’s contribution necessarily being in itself a complete work. 
Conversation also happens across time, with ideas, forms, phrases and voices 
from people and conversations not physically present.  Ingrid Monson provides a 
particularly rich example when describing an episode in which she and drummer 
Ralph Peterson respond to a recording of a particular performance: 
After one rhythmic exchange I remarked, “Salt Peanuts!” since Geri Allen’s piano 
figure . . . reminded me of Gillespie’s famous riff. . . . Peterson commented: “Yeah!” 
“Salt Peanuts” and “Looney Toons”—kind of a combination of the two.  Art Blakey 
has a thing he plays.  It’s like:  [he sings measures . . . of a musical example].  And 
Geri played: [he sings measures . . . of another musical example.]  So I played the 
second half of the Art Blakey phrase:  [sings another phrase]. 59 
Note the layers of reference here, and their overlapping significance:  Peterson, 
one of the performers in the recording, describes his reference and mental 
association, his response to the pianist’s reference and affirms Monson’s reference 
as well.  Each participant (including Monson the listener) identifies some meaning 
in the piece, and the performer affirms all of them.  These are references to works 
and people who were not physically present, but who are evoked by their re-use: 
that moment in performance was a conversation with and by means of musical and 
 56. See, e.g., BERLINER, supra note 11, at 497 (discussing how musicians favor the 
“conversation” metaphor for improvisation and enact it on many levels, and describing how players’ and 
performers’ musical acts comprise a conversation with themselves, their predecessor in the jazz 
tradition, their instruments and each other); MONSON, supra note 10, at 73 (discussing “improvisation as 
conversation;” also, the book is titled and premised on the idea that jazz improvisation is an act of 
“saying something,” i.e., that it is a kind of communication).  See generally R. Keith Sawyer, The 
Semiotics of Improvisation:  The Pragmatics of Musical and Verbal Performance, 108 SEMIOTICA 269 
(1996) (defining the act of improvisation as “musical conversation” that parallels the collaborative 
practices involved in talking). 
 57. MONSON, supra note 10, at 32 (quoting Richard Davis, musician and Professor of Bass 
(European Classical and Jazz), Jazz History and combo improvisation at the University of Wisconsin—
Madison). 
 58. Id. at 78 (quoting Ralph Peterson, an American jazz drummer and band leader). 
 59. Id. at 77 (quoting Ingrid Monson & Ralph Peterson). 
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cultural expressions as well as with the musicians and listeners who share 
knowledge of those expressions.  It is a conversation between the musicians and 
each other, but also their memories, their histories and listeners’ memories and 
histories as well. 
Improvisation scholars often describe improvisation practices as particularly 
open, flexible and dynamic, in a way that can foster more inclusive visions of 
community:  “[T]he flexible, multiply mediated nature of navigable structure [the 
basis of improvisation] makes it possible for individuals to perform with many 
kinds of musicians, encouraging exchanges, dialogues and collaborations . . . . 
[and] encourages multiple readings of improvised potentialities.”60  This flexibility 
and multiplicity evokes a vibrant musical discourse that echoes concepts like 
“democratic discourse” discussed in other legal analyses of the limiting values on 
copyright law.61  Neal Netanel champions a different goal for copyright than 
economic policy:  “democratic pluralism,” saying “A democratic order depends 
upon a domain in which citizens develop the independent spirit, self-direction, 
social responsibility, discursive skill, political awareness, and mutual 
recognition.”62  Netanel suggests that copyright policy should be informed by a 
state interest in open and diverse participation in public discourse.  Music, as an 
important part of our cultural landscape, can be seen as an aspect of democratic 
pluralism:  shared language and collaborative practices cement communities 
through reinforcing shared values.  Netanel makes the case for popular culture in 
this very regard:  “as both a resource and a playing field for the exercise of 
democratic culture and civic association.”63  Copyright law relies on creating 
values generated by exclusion and permission, which could limit this resource and 
narrow or tilt the playing field through a “permission culture.”64  This “permission 
culture” encourages attitudes about music that can hinder our ability to draw on or 
play in musical discourse.65  At the very least, any changes to a legal regime that 
 60. Reason, supra note 41, at 75. 
 61. Balkin, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27 n.46 (2004) (arguing that “the free speech principle is the key 
battleground for the legal protection of capital in the information economy” and critiquing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Eldred v. Ashcroft decision as a “cavalier dismissal of the important free speech 
interests in limited copyright terms”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:  
What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2001) (arguing that “autonomy interests” of 
free speech “are also served when a person chooses to copy what someone else has said, endorsing it as 
her own” and that “[t]he extension of protection to every speaker . . . can be justified by reference to 
general democratic theory”). 
 62. Netanel, supra note 5, at 359–62. 
 63. Id. at 351. 
 64. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1193. 
 65. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, 
J., concurring) (describing restrictions faced by an author seeking to make a sequel to GONE WITH THE 
WIND, from Margaret Mitchell’s estate); PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES:  
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 29, 
35 (2004), available at http://www.acsil.org/resources/rights-clearances-1/nps240.tmp.pdf.  See 
generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?  FREE EXPRESSION IN THE 
AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/ 
WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (discussing how “clearance culture” has harmed the free exchange of ideas as 
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has the potential to introduce new sets of permissions and restrictions should be 
analyzed in the context of its effect on interactivity and play since copyright law 
has the potential to limit the lively flourishing of culture.66  Taking seriously the 
value of less restricted interactions should encourage us to recognize the modest 
role that copyright law plays in the creative process.67 
2.  Community-Building with Audiences 
“Acting in concert, improvisers and audiences deploy the interactive 
technologies of improvisation to establish the potential of alternative creative 
identities, new relational structures that configure community.”68 
As discussed above, an audience’s role, as well as other performers, is often 
considered vitally important to the creative process of improvisation.69  This could 
complicate copyright assignment, if it was ever believed to be a significant creative 
contribution.  It seems unlikely that audiences—usually cast as passive 
consumers—would be granted exclusive rights.  However, despite the traditional 
image of a lone soloist emoting purely from an inner, individual self into a crowd 
who can be either “receptive” or “unreceptive,” much improvisation involves a 
more dynamic relationship, which makes space for audiences to be contributors to 
the creative act, and for them to be future as well as current improvisers in that 
tradition.  Thus, improvisation may actually alter and break audience passivity, 
requiring more engagement and giving back more reciprocal responses from 
performers.70  In this view, improvisation invites the audience into the process of 
music-making in a way that also models a more dynamic and engaged kind of 
human social interaction.  Indeed, as Lee Kaplan, avant-garde jazz series curator 
and musician, says:  “[o]ne of the really important factors in improvisation, when 
you’re playing for people, is the fact that there is an audience, and they can change 
the music entirely . . . .  That’s what makes the music interesting.  In that way it’s a 
living music; it’s different each time.”71 
It would be radical indeed to suggest that audiences should get ownership or 
other control over musical works they participate in creating (although taking 
audiences more seriously might have implications for other rights such as the right 
to make derivative works).72  However, a middle ground might be to not deny 
embodied in the principle of “fair use”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (containing 
a discussion of how copyright law enforcement leads to overemphasis on permission and licenses to the 
detriment of creativity and culture). 
 66. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:  Intellectual Property 
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV 1853, 1866 (1991). 
 67. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1193 (suggesting a “more modest conception of the role that 
copyright plays in stimulating creative processes and practices”). 
 68. Reason, supra note 41, at 82. 
 69. BERLINER, supra note 11, at 468 (describing how audience members participate in the 
musical conversation of live improvisation). 
 70. Id., at 455–56. 
 71. Forum, supra note 54, at 66–67. 
 72. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 164 (discussing fan-made unauthorized derivative works). 
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audiences the kinds of access that they enjoy.  There is more going on between 
musicians and audiences than a duel over exclusive rights—focusing on access 
rather than exclusion might be more consistent with the dynamic in the moment of 
improvisation.  Equity-based arguments that rely on musicians’ rights to exclusive 
control over performances tend to ignore the audience’s importance as well as other 
contextual factors in the creative process.73  When considering equity, we should 
account for the collaborative nature of creation, and when discussing incentives we 
must account for incentives related to social relationships including the audiences 
as creative partners as well as consumers. 
3.  Improvisation and Resistance 
While there is no reason to assume that every instance of improvisation is in its 
content resistant or critical, some improvisers and scholars point to an “identifiable 
and radical form of improvisational practices,” which consciously opposes itself to 
mainstream culture, resisting majority cultural and political forces.74  Because 
democratic participation in society requires and values dissent, we should carefully 
examine legal changes that could raise the cost of dissent.  Those altering the legal 
context in which improvisation occurs should address whether this form of 
improvisation is especially threatened by increased commodification or 
propertization.75 
There does exist plenty of testimony to people’s experience of improvisation 
“encourag[ing them] to see beyond the chord changes of consensus reality,” as Ron 
Sakolsky says about his political awakening through listening to John Coltrane.76  
Jazz improvisation also has the potential to help us “use the transformative powers 
of our imagination as the basis for reclaiming our creativity in a world of 
miserabilist compromises.”77  If improvisatory music can be both criticism and a 
means of awakening critical faculties, when proposing alterations to copyright, we 
should ask how attaching property rights and permissions would affect this process. 
Lastly, many improvisation scholars in the jazz community emphasize that 
community practices should be supported in order to resist outside pressures or 
racism and economic exploitation.78  If the social cohesion arising out of 
 73. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1190 (noting that “creative play” is an important aspect of 
creative practice). 
 74. Fischlin & Heble, supra note 29, at 2. 
 75. See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (2003) (arguing 
for the need to “deprivatize” copyright in order to realize the public good of cultural production); 
HOWARD BESSER, COMMODIFICATION OF CULTURE HARMS CREATORS (2001), available at 
http://besser.tsoa.nyu.edu/howard/Copyright/ala-commons.html (arguing that the commodification of 
cultural heritage will have negative implications for artists and creators). 
 76. Ron Sakolsky, Hangin’ Out at the Corner of Music and Resistance, in REBEL MUSICS:  
HUMAN RIGHTS, RESISTANT SOUNDS, AND THE POLITICS OF MUSIC MAKING 46 (Ajay Heble & Daniel 
Fischlin eds., 2003). 
 77. Id. at 51. 
 78. Daniel Fischlin, Human Rights, Resistant Sounds, and the Politics of Music Making, in REBEL 
MUSICS:  HUMAN RIGHTS, RESISTANT SOUNDS, AND THE POLITICS OF MUSIC MAKING, supra note 76, at 
30. 
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improvisatory practices is especially important to endangered, exploited and 
threatened communities, then it is especially important to understand how those 
communities maintain themselves and the role that cultural practices like 
improvisation play in that maintenance. 
4.  Improvisation and Cultural Citizenship 
As outlined above, the values most prevalent in improvisation tend towards a 
vision of human interaction that some call “cultural citizenship,” a concept from 
popular music scholarship defined as “the process of bonding and community 
building, and reflection on that bonding, that is implied in partaking of the text-
related practices of reading, consuming, celebrating, and criticizing . . . .”79  Neal 
Netanel’s “the exercise of democratic culture and civic association” is a good 
parallel term, and he specifically argues that such practices are evident and possible 
in “the realm of popular culture”: 
[T]he autonomous creation, critical interpretation, and transformation even of works 
of pure aesthetics or entertainment helps to support a participatory culture.  Citizens 
who engage in these activities gain a measure of expressive vitality and independence 
of thought that may carry over into matters of more unequivocal public import as 
well.80 
By any stretch, this seems a desirable outcome for cultural policy, and legal 
institutions that can shape human interaction should be sensitive to this possibility, 
as well as to the more easily measurable outcome of royalties. 
Consider Derek Borgo’s comment that “[f]ree improvisation, it appears, is best 
envisioned as a forum in which to explore various cooperative and conflicting 
interactive strategies”; or the statement that “improvisation is . . . about 
reinvigorating public life with the spirit of dialogue and difference that 
improvisatory practices consistently gesture toward.”81  Even if this is not true for 
all improvisation, cultural policy makers should be excited about the possibility to 
facilitate such a dynamic. 
III.  WHO, WHAT AND WHY PROTECT? 
A.  ARE IMPROVISERS THE SAME AS OTHER ARTISTS? 
The main argument for copyright ownership in improvisation is that improvisers 
are just like other artists, and what they make is analogous to other kinds of music.  
In other cases the arguments describe improvisers’ vast contributions to musical 
 79. Jean Burgess, Marcus Foth & Helen Klaebe, Everyday Creativity as Civic Engagement:  A 
Cultural Citizenship View of New Media, 2006 PROC. COMM. POL’Y & RES. F. 4, available at 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/5056/1/5056_1.pdf (quoting JOKE HERMES, RE-READING POPULAR CULTURE 
(2005)). 
 80. Netanel, supra note 5, at 351. 
 81. Borgo, supra note 10, at 184; Fischlin & Heble, supra note 29, at 17. 
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genres and products over time and argue that copyright’s absence de facto harms 
improvisers.82 
These arguments do not attend so much to the improvisation as a specific 
practice engaged with by particular communities, but instead rely on two 
generalizations.  One is that art making can be understood as a generic practice, 
regardless of the social context in which specific kinds of art develop.  But how 
generically can we discuss art making and still have a meaningful discussion?  It 
might be better to examine art making in the context of both artists’ self-identified 
goals and functions and also broader social goals and functions, rather than just to 
take all art as fundamentally a product-making enterprise. 
The second generalization underpinning the “improvisers are just like other 
artists” argument relies on broad based and abstract conceptions of rights.  This 
idea of rights that can be implemented across the board with similar meaning, no 
matter which people or social practices are involved, at the very least ignores the 
fact that improvisation differs in important respects from precomposition practices, 
and those differences may be incompatible with copyright law.83  At worst, this 
broad idea of rights also ignores the specific power relations that different people 
may have in that it can affect their ability to define and enforce rights. 
B.  IMPROVISERS ARE DIFFERENT AND DESERVE PROTECTION 
There is also an argument for improvisers’ copyrights based on difference rather 
than sameness.  We must not ignore the racial underpinnings of improvisatory 
music and debates around it.  For instance, a racially conscious analysis of 
improvisation could support an argument that improvisers should be protected, not 
due to their similarity to other artists, but rather due to their being members of a 
social group deserving of special attention.  White dominated legal, economic and 
cultural institutions have regularly and systematically excluded jazz (historically 
black music) and black artists from the ability to benefit financially from their 
works.84  Copyright law and institutions have undeniably rejected black artists and 
their traditions, both explicitly, as with ASCAP not allowing black members, or 
implicitly in the contours of copyright that leave out many aspects of musical 
traditions mainly dominated by people of African descent.85 
In this context, it does not make sense to weigh the value to society as a whole 
of stripping black artists of the ability to pay their bills (although doing so is 
 82. See Hines, supra note 10, at 483 (“The modern jazz style . . . greatly suffered because of its 
incompatibility with copyright protection.”).  Hines suggests that there was a shortage of musical 
recordings of this kind of jazz, but doesn’t elaborate on how this can be interpreted as the style suffering. 
 83. See id. at 472 (“The entire nature of improvisational performance contrasts with . . . copyright 
law."); Kurt Blaukopf, Westernisation, Modernisation, and the Mediamorphosis of Music, 20 INT’L REV. 
AESTHETICS & SOC. MUSIC 183, 190 (1989) (“The concept of copyright, as developed in Europe and, by 
now, also applied in many non-European countries, does not take into consideration the specificity of 
musics that are partly or totally independent of notational efforts.”). 
 84. Greene, supra note 23, at 1180–81. 
 85. Id., at 1189; Hines, supra note 10, at 465. 
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enlightening in the context of reparations).86  The characteristics of music 
associated with people of African descent, like that of so many other exploited 
groups, cannot simply be the result of their exclusion from legal protection.87  
Indeed, there is a long history of scholarship from outside and within black 
communities on aspects of music that are argued to connect to African traditions, or 
to traditions of resistance, which specifically should not be “integrated” into market 
transactions or whose significance comes from subverting the meaning of market 
transactions.88  Without taking an explicit stand on some of the more essentialist 
arguments about black traditions and black music, it is arguably true that many 
practices contribute value to the communities who engage in them, and that value 
cannot be measured in direct economic terms.  The flourishing of those 
communities depends partly on those values, and their flourishing contributes to a 
healthy society.  Therefore, society must not neglect these noncommodity values in 
its copyright policy.89 
From a market-based perspective, communities of noncopyright owners are truly 
at a disadvantage and have been historically disadvantaged in relation to copyright 
owners.  However, at least some of that advantage is based in the differing social 
positions of, in this case, black artists and white artists/entrepreneurs.  The United 
States in the 1930s, 40s and 50s was a white supremacist society:  white artists and 
entrepreneurs had better access to and representation in nearly all institutions for 
profit making and to legal institutions as well. 90  A great many of the artists who 
were never paid royalties or other copyright related rights were and are in this 
situation legally, due to work for hire contracts and other supposedly voluntary 
arrangements.91  The imbalances between white institutions and black artists is not 
created by copyright law, and thus shifting rules of copyright would have changed 
some of the pieces on the board, but not necessarily the rules of the game. 
This is not to undermine the real deprivation that black artists (among others) 
 86. See Greene, supra note 23, at 1208–22. 
 87. See generally HILDRED ROACH, BLACK AMERICAN MUSIC (1973) (a history of the many 
influences and institutions that shape black musical practices, including many more motivations than 
copyright ownership alone); TRICIA ROSE, BLACK NOISE:  RAP MUSIC AND BLACK CULTURE IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1994) (describing black musical culture as arising out of the situation of 
Black American’s systematic oppression far beyond simply the lack of copyright ownership and 
exclusion from systems of power, but also in relation to historical traditions including some stretching 
back to Africa and to autonomously defined concepts of identity and community that enable survival 
and resistance in the face of racist institutions). 
 88. See PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC:  MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 105 
(1993); Hines, supra note 10, at 469–73. 
 89. See Netanel, supra note 5, at 321. 
 90. See Robert C. Kloosterman & Chris Quispel, Not Just the Same Old Show on My Radio:  An 
Analysis of the Role of Radio in the Diffusion of Black Music Among Whites in the South of the United 
States of America, 1920 to 1960, 9 POPULAR MUSIC 151, 159 (1990) (arguing that ASCAP 
systematically discriminated against “race music” written and performed by black artists, until 
challenged by BMI); see also Timothy Dowd, Production Perspectives in the Sociology of Music, 32 
POETICS 235, 243 (2004) (positing that dominant actors in the recording, performance rights and radio 
industries did not view “race” music as a category of music with broad appeal). 
 91. See Hines, supra note 10, at 485 (arguing that unconscionable contracts divested black 
musicians of copyrights to their works). 
MANN - FINAL 2/28/2011  6:05:34 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION REQUIREMENT AND CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 221 
 
suffer, but instead to suggest that intellectual property rights as usually defined are 
a problematic solution to that deprivation.  This is true both because musical 
practices are socially embedded, and thus altering their legal context could alter the 
context of that social system, and also because the noncommodity value of so-
called intellectual property can in fact be altered or destroyed by inclusion in a 
marketplace.92 
For those who are still concerned with historic exclusion from the market, there 
is yet another angle on this if we view the marketplace as a dynamic system.  As 
changing methods of production, marketing and distribution have encouraged many 
in the music industry to shift away from marketing specific commodities in the 
digital era, noncommodity understandings of music performance and circulation 
may be well suited to the new digital music economy.  Meanwhile, the companies 
leading the fight to preserve commodified music are to some extent the companies 
that constructed the legal system that legally bargained away many black artists’ 
rights (as well as many other artists in poor bargaining positions).  Arguments for 
artists’ rights ought to be informed by a clearer understanding of what actually are 
artists’ needs and practices with respect to copyright. 
C.  THE COSTS OF COPYRIGHT CALCULATION 
For those who argue that copyright law should protect improvisation through 
altering or eliminating the fixation requirement, the next logical step is to analyze 
how that protection would work—dissecting improvisation into its elements in 
order to analyze how they fall into or outside of the scope of copyright. 
As discussed above, most scholarship on improvisatory music emphasizes that it 
is not “pure, spontaneous creation,” but is in fact composition in real time, drawing 
on an array of musical choices including pre-existing musical ideas, genres, styles 
and musical phrases.93  In this, the same three basic elements constitute 
improvisatory music and also comprise any musical work:  original contributions, 
elements drawn from copyrighted works and elements drawn from the public 
domain (consisting of uncopyrightable elements and works whose copyright has 
expired).94  The analysis of improvisation could proceed along similar lines as any 
musical work—assessing and evaluating various components’ contribution to the 
whole.  In the traditional analysis, the question for improvisation would only be 
whether the balance of original contributions versus the other contributions is high 
enough to warrant copyright protection. 
There is much agreement both within and without the legal field that 
improvisatory practices would make calculation particularly difficult.95  While the 
 92. See McDonald, supra note 5, at 554 (positing that commodification of information no longer 
produces the desired outcome of educating, and instead is motivated by producing profit). 
 93. See supra Part I-A. 
 94. See TOYNBEE, supra note 35 (arguing that authors are better understood as combining 
historically common work to create an output rather than being solely responsible for their work). 
 95. See King, supra note 4, at 314–15 (arguing that improvisations and musical techniques in jazz 
music frustrate an easy application of existing law); Hines, supra note 10, at 472 (positing that 
improvisatory copyright practices disadvantaged early progenitors of Black music). 
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difficulty is perhaps not insurmountable in theory, the question of how the law and 
jazz musicians would administer rights leads one into a thicket of competing and 
overlapping claims that musicians as well as judges may feel disinclined to enter.  
The amount of time and energy spent figuring out the basis on which to claim 
ownership might well outweigh the benefit of doing so. 
From the other side of the calculation—measuring the benefit to society—we 
can see that if improvised works were copyrightable, that would reduce the number 
of works in the public domain and limit the accessibility of those works to others 
even in the context of improvisation.  Whether this would harm the social benefits 
from improvisation is a calculation that most often is made in terms of the numbers 
of works in question, but that also requires attention to the increasing complexity of 
legal calculation.96  While a problem faced by any change in legal parameters, 
increasing complexity is a cost in itself by requiring a calculation of ownership 
rights while improvising. 97  Removing or altering the fixation requirement would 
increase uncertainty about copyrighted works that exist, regarding what is available 
to draw on as an improviser.  Since improvisations would be copyrighted, every 
improvisation would no longer be automatic fodder for other improvisations.  
Extending copyright to other works would not only shrink the pool improvisers 
draw on, but also add a different kind of calculation to the process of 
improvisation—calculating the ownership of different pieces of music, or the 
known attitudes of different copyright owners towards use of their works.  This 
calculation has little to do with the aesthetic and social kinds of creative decision 
making involved in improvisation, and arguably could interfere with or complicate 
that process, thus harming the flexibility of improvisation. 
Since unfixed works will be difficult to argue in court, lacking (by definition) 
material evidence of their existence, it is unlikely that many cases could be brought 
at all.  Calculations of procedural costs are also difficult to weigh, particularly 
given the longstanding evidence from sociolegal studies that few disputes in any 
realm of law make it into the courtroom at all.98  A compelling way out of this 
calculative and speculative thicket is to examine more closely the process of 
improvisation beyond just the choices of what to include or not and to examine the 
specifics of improvisatory music practices, rather than products/works, and how 
they would be affected by being subject to copyright control. 
 96. See generally Lichtman, supra note 6 (finding that social costs of litigation regarding 
evidentially complex copyright cases tend to exclude them from copyright regime). 
 97. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods:  Trading Gold for Dross, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 191 (2002) (arguing that the calculating process stifles the creative process). 
 98. See generally Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don't 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
4 (1983) (stating that a small number of disputants bring claims to court); Richard E. Miller & Austin 
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:  Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 
(1980) (finding that few disputes are taken to court). 
MANN - FINAL 2/28/2011  6:05:34 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION REQUIREMENT AND CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 223 
 
IV.  HOW COPYRIGHTING UNFIXED WORKS COULD DIMINISH 
SOCIAL VALUE 
As described above, the social values arising from, embodied in and possibly 
inculcated by improvisation may not be compatible with copyright enforcement.  
Harms to these values could arise in a number of different ways. 
A.  REDUCING PLAY 
If flexibility and play are essential for cultural progress, a system that requires 
permission before playing with existing works, if possible, is lower in flexibility 
than one that does not. 99  As discussed above, improvisatory music is likely at the 
far end of the spectrum of music practices in terms of a high reliance on flexibility 
and play, and thus would be most likely affected by copyright law’s restrictive 
effects.100 
B.  INCREASED COMMODIFICATION 
Scholars of improvisation have argued that “the social force of improvised 
music resides, at least in part, in its capacity to disrupt institutionally sanctioned 
economies of production, to trouble the assumptions and expectations of fixity 
fostered by dominant systems of knowledge production.”101  This argument echoes 
some First Amendment concerns about how and when people can participate in 
culture making (for which I reinterpret the term “knowledge production”), although 
it is grounded in a more radical critique of the economics of culture making.  To 
focus more closely on that critique, the implication for music is that supporting a 
profit oriented musical practice is not the best or at least the only way to maximize 
music’s social contribution.102  Such an assertion renders problematic the argument 
that participation in the commercial music industry is liberatory. 
However, anticommercial arguments can run the danger of minimizing the harm 
to people who have been systematically excluded from the chance to profit from 
one’s work.103  Even so, some proponents of liberating systematically excluded 
peoples have pushed back against the “property rights as power” argument, 
 99. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1192–94 (arguing that decentering creativity from copyright law 
emphasizes the importance of play in the cultural landscape). 
 100. Barron, supra note 39, at 48 (positing that “ascribing individual ownership rights to aspects of 
a shared tradition would undoubtedly obstruct the ‘flow’ of collective musical creativity”). 
 101. Fischlin & Heble , supra note 29, at 22. 
 102. See Mark Anthony Neal, “. . . A Way Out of No Way”:  Jazz, Hip-Hop, and Black Social 
Improvisation, in THE OTHER SIDE OF NOWHERE:  JAZZ, IMPROVISATION AND COMMUNITIES IN 
DIALOGUE, supra note 29, at 202, 208 (arguing that improvisation’s value was at least partly in the 
production and reproduction of viable and meaningful personal and group identities, which are in 
tension with “global market forces where ‘authenticity’ is styled to meet the demands of global 
consumers”). 
 103. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1331, 1334–35 (2004) (arguing that “differing circumstances—including knowledge, wealth, 
power, access, and ability—render some better able than others to exploit a commons”). 
MANN - FINAL 2/28/2011  6:05:34 PM 
224 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:2 
 
asserting instead that “the expressive modalities of black culture have repeatedly 
had to struggle against processes of reduction and commodification, processes” 
that, as Paul Gilroy has noted, have first and foremost had the effect of turning 
black music into “forms . . . in which [it could be] fast frozen and sold.”104  Gilroy 
emphasizes the harm such commodification does to a living tradition of resistance 
and regeneration.105  Thus, commodification can work against even the very social 
goals that copyright law is supposedly aimed at, due to its focus on the “myopic 
outlook that copyrighted work is a good in and of itself.”106 
And then there is the question, unpopular among legal scholars but vital to 
musicians, of music’s value to musicians, i.e., its quality, using the term “creative” 
as a measure of quality.  Jazz musician Harold Budd goes so far as to argue that the 
process of recording itself with its attendant freezing and commodification is at 
least irrelevant to creativity:  “[T]here is really very, very little creative happening 
in a recording.  Jazz recording is a very uncreative affair because the recording is 
documenting a performance—it may be a mediocre one, or it may be an excellent 
one, it doesn’t make any difference . . . .”107  Implicitly rejecting a market valuation 
of music, his statement assumes that music quality is known before it goes on sale, 
and suggests that recording encourages a commodity mentality, where value is 
based on sales figures.108  This commodification, which brings our decisions about 
creativity into a market process, changes the meaning and content of those 
creations and influences the nature of creative decision making.109 
However, property ownership does confer some power in the marketplace, 
which is necessary for survival and perhaps resistance to exploitation as well.  As 
discussed above and in scholarship on jazz, in blues and black music, as well as in 
international contexts, the debate of market power versus commodification rages 
on.110  Property ownership can confer power, but also exacts the price of 
commodifying the propertized resource, making the resource intelligible to the 
legal system that one used to protect it, but perhaps less intelligible to the people 
who made it or possibly altering the way they judge intelligibility.111  This 
argument has also been made with respect to propertizing biological resources and 
knowledge about those resources where a people can risk both restructuring that 
 104. See GILROY, supra note 88, at 105. 
 105. Id. 
 106. McDonald, supra note 5 at 544; see also Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing for a shift away from property-based rhetoric when 
discussing copyrights, patents and trademarks). 
 107. Forum, supra note 54, at 54 (quoting Harold Budd). 
 108. Elkin-Koren, supra note 34, at 399 (“Once we realize that everything we write, draw, or play 
could be licensed, we start conceiving of our own self-expressions as commodities.”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See generally Chander & Sunder, supra note 103, at 1335 (arguing that the public domain has 
been a source of exploiting the works of disempowered groups); Greene, supra note 23, (arguing that 
black artists historically were denied the benefits of their intellectual property). 
 111. See Marc Perlman, Global Regulation of Intangible Cultural Heritage:  Between Stewardship 
and Ownership, in MAKING AND UNMAKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN 
LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (Mario Biagioli et al. eds., forthcoming March 2011) (calling this 
“the paradox of empowerment”). 
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knowledge through applying a legal framework to it, or increasing exploitation of 
heritage if it is left outside of legal protection.112  Granting property rights to those 
who wish to resist exploitation could be the answer, or at least a way to prevent all 
profits from accruing to the most powerful.  Even so, encouraging a property or 
commodity relation to dominate the meaning of a cultural product may have 
undesired effects.  Harm to cultural practices and cultural identity may be hard to 
measure, but may be irrevocable, which should at least inspire caution to those who 
could increase commodification.113 
Scholars of folklore and others concerned with cultural survival make similar 
arguments:  while “poaching” and imitation do real harm to the community, some 
wonder if the “cure” of propertization is worse than the disease.114  Legal scholars 
have warned us that “[r]eliance on property rights may weaken the dialogic virtue 
of information that is a key to individuals’ participation in the creation of 
culture.”115  If this argument is remotely true for information as a dialogic entity, it 
is much more so for improvisation, which is, according to many accounts, as 
dialogic as it gets.116 
C.  OPTING OUT OF THE COMMUNITY 
The aspects of improvisation that foster the most inclusive and collaborative 
practices are the ones which least fit copyright law.  From incompleteness to 
collaborativity to the need for and ability to encourage audience contributions 
through repetition, reference and familiarity, these elements are not likely to be 
 112. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 103, at 1341, 1343 (“[L]aw turns a blind eye to the fact 
that . . . the public domain has been a source for exploiting . . . people of color, the poor, women, and 
people from the global South.”). 
 113. See generally Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of 
Commodification, Introduction to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION:  CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & 
CULTURE 8 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). 
 114. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:  Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 
DUKE L.J. 87, 95–99 (1997) (discussing the tendency in intellectual property to “over” protect, resulting 
in the extreme privatization of the public domain); Shane Greene, Indigenous People Incorporated?  
Culture as Politics, Culture as Property in Pharmaceutical Bioprospecting, 45 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 211, 220–21 (2004) (analyzing the impact of pharmaceutical bioprospecting on 
“indigenous forms of representation” and “the ramifications of the incorporation of indigenous groups in 
claiming culture as property”).  See generally Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of 
Indigenous Peoples:  Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that 
indigenous art presents many difficulties that do not square with the western intellectual property 
regime); Caroline Humphrey & Katherine Verdery, Raising Questions About Property, Introduction to 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION:  VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (Katherine Verdery & 
Caroline Humphrey eds., 2004); Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge:  
A Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1613 (2005) (critiquing the approach of the intellectual property regime with respect to the 
“traditional knowledge” that undergirds many communities in the developing world). 
 115. Elkin-Koren, supra note 34, at 399. 
 116. John P. Murphy, Jazz Improvisation:  The Joy of Influence, 18 BLACK PERSP. MUSIC 7, 15 
(1990) (quoting jazz performer Joe Henderson:  “You know how you quote people as a player.  You use 
semicolons, hyphens, paragraphs, parentheses, stuff like this.  I’m thinking like this when I’m playing.  
I’m having a conversation with somebody.”). 
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furthered through copyright ownership.  However, they are argued by many to be 
the very building blocks of community.117 
Musicians and music scholars are not the only ones that express concern over 
propertization’s social effects.  Shubha Ghosh’s concept of copyright as 
“privatization” raises similar concerns.118  Characterizing privatization as “a shift 
from the centrality of the political and civic spheres to the centrality of the market 
and individual experience,” Ghosh emphasizes the possibility of a public interest in 
fostering political and civic spheres, which might encourage limits on copyright’s 
scope in exactly the way suggested here.119 
Suggesting that giving people a choice to opt out or cash in affects their social 
relationships sounds paternalistic, and the idea that we might deny people choices 
rather than have them make a bad choice is illiberal indeed.  But the emphasis on 
choice is in itself a social norm; we can see this most clearly with respect to 
commodification, which is, in the United States, one place where laws have 
prevented us from making a choice with respect to our children and our bodies (to 
some extent), and where many find it acceptable to deny that choice on other 
grounds.120  While clearly music is already highly commodified, in the case of 
improvisation it is particularly embedded in social relationships that might make 
that choice more of a break with community norms, and socially destructive as 
well. 
Changing copyright rules can affect musical practice.  For example, making it 
possible to own a property interest in a formerly collective enterprise means the 
cost of breaking away from a collaborative community goes down.  Add in the 
facts that a definition of authorship may favor particular groups or traditions, and 
that the ability to use law on one’s behalf is not evenly distributed, and we can see 
how the ability to commodify processes might encourage fragmentation of the 
communities from which those processes originate.121 
V.  CONCLUSION:  PLAY, NON-MARKET MECHANISMS AND 
DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE 
Improvisation emphasizes process over product creativity, an engendered sense of 
freedom and discovery, the dialogical nature of real-time interaction, the sensual 
aspects of performance over abstract intellectual concerns, and a participatory 
aesthetic over passive reception.  Its inherent transience and expressive immediacy 
even challenge the dominant modes of consumption that have arisen in modern, mass-
market economies and the sociopolitical and spiritual efficacy of art in general.122 
 117. Id. at 9 (“By invoking and reworking music that is familiar to the audience, the jazz performer 
involves the audience in the process and makes it meaningful for those who recognize the sources.”). 
 118. Ghosh, supra note 75, at 387. 
 119. Id. at 395. 
 120. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 131–53 (1996). 
 121. Ghosh, supra note 75, at 417 (describing several examples of how copyright owners’ interests 
are set against users who are part of communities of expression). 
 122. Borgo, supra note 10, at 184–85. 
MANN - FINAL 2/28/2011  6:05:34 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION REQUIREMENT AND CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 227 
As above, many involved in improvisation and the study of improvisation assert 
its value in terms that directly contradict a commodified and individualistic view of 
music making.  The social values embodied and reproduced by improvisatory 
practice help creativity flourish:  the concept of “play” or “purposive creative 
experimentation . . . serendipitous access to cultural resources and . . . unexpected 
juxtapositions of those resources” is a crucial element of creativity, including the 
atmosphere that fosters it.123  Play also has a broader social effect, as it “increases 
the likelihood that someone will see, hear or think the world differently.”124  
Furthermore, “[w]ithin the realm of creative practice, the play of culture is the to-
and-fro in flows of artistic and cultural goods and in cultural practices of 
representation.  Play in this sense is an essential enabling condition of cultural 
progress.”125  This reciprocity is also a crucial element of creative practice: 
“creativity thrives not only on the ability to cash in on one’s ideas—an ability that 
one gets from property—but also on a kind of free-wheeling give and take.”126 
Reciprocity, as discussed by scholars of law and of music, is quite different from 
economic exchange—note that the previous quote explicitly sets it against 
commodification.  Commodification encourages us to evaluate creative works 
based on their price, which leaves out important social values, and may even 
diminish their actual effects.127  But those social values have importance for 
democracy, fairness and social cohesion. 
Neal Netanel has made a project of identifying those noncommodity social 
values, contextualizing them with a democratic vision of society: 
In addition, the autonomous creation, critical interpretation, and transformation even 
of works of pure aesthetics or entertainment help to support a participatory culture.  
Citizens who engage in these activities gain a measure of expressive vitality and 
independence of thought that may carry over into matters of more unequivocal public 
import as well.128 
Although the fixation requirement can be analyzed in terms of its effect on 
individual creators, doing so ignores the full spectrum of their practices, their 
interrelationships in communities and the value those interrelationships generate for 
themselves and broader society.  The concept of “cultural citizenship” captures 
some of the values that copyright law in its usual configuration does not always 
directly contribute to.  So, for example, if we see improvisation as “a fertile space 
for the enactment and articulation of the divergent narratives of both individuals 
and cultures,” we must look at how those practices, which sound very much like 
democratic participation in public discourse, would be affected by copyright 
 
 123. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1190. 
  Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
r
reated through nonmarket mechanisms is 
mmunity building.”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1191. 
 126. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:
T ades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998). 
 127. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 34, at 386 (“[C]ontent c
a valuable form of self-expression and co
 128. Netanel, supra note 5, at 351. 
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law.129  Copyright law is cultural policy, that is, law affecting how culture is made 
and engaged with, and it should take into account the prospective effects on 
cultural citiz
The fixation requirement, excluding some works and practices from copyright, 
promotes cultural citizenship in several ways.  One way may seem contradictory to 
my argument:  by providing financial incentive to record or otherwise get a work 
into fixed form, it provides the possibility to control certain later uses of the works.  
The value of doing so includes the possibility of future material reward for the 
copyright owner of that form, the kind of artistic control that is possible through 
relying on the legal system.  Incentivizing recording also has a social value akin to 
that of disclosure in patent law because fixed works, written and recorded, have the 
possibility to last over time and to be transmitted or copied in ways that ultimately 
contribute to culture at large and ultimately to the public domain.130  But although 
attaching copyright provides a certain amount of good—one that some economists 
suggest has been historically overvalued—this does not mean that broadening 
copyright’s scope will provide more good.131  As discussed above, the fixation 
requirement serves several valuable social purposes through allowing dynamic 
flexibility and room for play that would be more difficult if legal ownership were 
ascribed. 
My argument is necessarily limited in its direct legal applicability since in fact it 
deals with only some musical practices—since many improvisatory works are 
recorded, some rights reside at least in that sound recording.132  But taking these 
concerns seriously has implications for many musical genres and communities.  For 
example, I am not the first to argue that many practices of cultural interactivity, 
community building and resistance that are associated here with jazz are also 
associated with the practice of sampling in hip hop.133  Therefore, it would be 
worth analyzing hip hop musical practices through some of the lenses provided 
here. 
Current suggestions for altering copyright law include, for example, introducing 
a performer’s right in sound recordings (which would go a long way towards 
remunerating jazz musicians), and altering the derivative works right (in some 
cases to allow arrangers, as well as performers, to own some copyrights).134  These 
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raise important questions for those concerned with the fair functioning of copyright 
law.  However, some recommendations rely more on an individualist and 
commodified approach to music making, while others focus on allowing more 
flexibility, interplay and participation.  While material advantages can make some 
musicians or institutions better able to profit from flexibility than others, we must 
not lose sight of the drawbacks of protective commodification.  Copyright, or the 
control of access to music, is not the only method of generating value, and we must 
recognize a broad definition of social value to include dynamic and socially 
embedded practices of music making.  We should examine their implications for 
copyright law as cultural policy. 
 
characterized as derivative works). 
